Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

506 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
men and equipment to carry out the kind of continual long-range
surveillance that would have been required to guard against a surprise
attack.
Naval Court of Inquiry Gains Access
to Japanese Intercepts
Finally on August 28, the 20th day of the inquiry, Kimmel’s
eff orts to have the Japanese intercepts introduced bore fruit.
Biesemeier introduced 40 or 50 items selected from among the
secret Japanese “Purple” intercepts known as MAGIC received
from November 26 to December 7, 1941. 49 Th e intercepts were
not actually entered into the text of the hearings, but would be
available to the court for reference. Th ey were “extracted from the
record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy . . . in the
interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the
war.” 50
Stark objected strenuously:
Should the secret classifi cation of the proceedings of this court
be removed, or should a copy of those proceedings or information
gained therefrom come into the possession of persons
unfriendly to this country while the present war with Japan
is still in progress, these certain questions . . . might suggest
enough to the enemy to be defi nitely injurious to our present
and continuing war eff ort. . . . [I]n due time,
he said, “proceedings of this court and all of the evidence it might
have secured will be a matter of open record available to the
public.” Th erefore, “as a responsible naval offi cer and as a former
Chief of Naval Operations with knowledge of many of the intelligence
activities of my subordinates,” Stark urged that
49Ibid., part 33, pp. 735, 767–69.
50Ibid., part 32, p. 521.