Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 505
own carriers, or some planes being ferried in from the United
States. 46
Th e two men who had actually manned the radar station on Oahu
on December 7, Joseph L. Lockard, radar operator, and George E.
Elliott, told of having picked up a cluster of blips on the radar
screen indicating “an unusually large fl ight . . . coming in from
almost due north at 130 some miles.” When they reported this
to the information center, it was assumed these blips were from
B-17 bombers being ferried to Hawaii from California. So their
radar report was not passed along to higher authority. 47
Admiral P.N.L. Bellinger, who on December 7 had been
commander of Hawaiian Based Patrol Wing Two and liaison
with the commandant of the 14th Naval District, testifi ed:
I was surprised to fi nd that there in the Hawaiian Islands,
an important naval advance outpost, we were operating on a
shoestring, and the more I looked the thinner the shoestring
appeared to be.
Moreover, according to a letter from NCO Stark, it appeared
that
there was no intention to replace the present obsolescent type
of patrol planes in Patrol Wing Two prior to one year, and that
Patrol Wing Two would practically be the last wing to be furnished
new planes.
Th is, “together with the many existing defi ciencies,” led Bellinger
to conclude “that the Navy Department as a whole did not view
the situation in the Pacifi c with alarm, or else is not taking steps
in keeping with their views.” 48 Th ere were by no means enough
46 Ibid., pp. 461, 473–74.
47 Ibid., Lockard and Elliott testimony, pp. 475–96.
48 Ibid., p. 501, Bellinger testimony referring to Stark serial letter O95323.