Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

504 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
an increasing number of warnings. . . . Th ey were not clear-cut.
. . . Th ey were in personal letters, the general tenor being—“I
hope you will keep ever present in your mind the possibility
that we may be at war tomorrow.”
Th e fi rst warning had not come from the Navy Department, but
rather from the War Department to the Commanding General
of the Hawaiian Department, probably on June 19, 1940. When
Richardson “asked the Chief of Naval Operations for information
regarding it [this warning]” he received no reply. 44
Kimmel “agreed . . . in general” with Richardson as to the
inadvisability of basing the fl eet at Pearl Harbor and he had discussed
Richardson’s objections with Stark. However, when he
took command, he had not made “any formal protest;” he had
“accepted the situation.” Later he had “pointed out the dangers
that existed so long as the fl eet was in Pearl Harbor.” Th e single
entrance might be blocked; it took a long time for the Fleet to
sortie, and the oil stocks were vulnerable. In view of these dangers,
Kimmel had requested “repeatedly, in correspondence” that
he “be kept informed of developments.” 45
In order to reach their own conclusions, the NCI went over
much of the same material covered by the Roberts and Hart
investigations. And it inquired about the radar facilities in Hawaii
at the time of the attack. Commander William E.G. Taylor, U.S.
Navy Reserve, radar expert on temporary duty with the Pacifi c
Fleet, testifi ed that the Army “radar operators themselves were
well-trained,” although given the technology available at the
time, it was
impossible to decide whether the plots picked up by the radar
station were a Japanese raid, an air group from one of our
44 Ibid., p. 626.
45 Ibid., p. 282.