Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 503
detachment to remain in Pearl Harbor that could be adequately
cared for by the facilities there.” 40 He said
the operating areas were not adequate, either for surface ships
or air; there were no air fi elds adequate to care for the planes
that were on carriers, and could not be trained from the carriers
because of the shortage of fuel. Th e only safe anchorage was
Pearl Harbor, and it was entirely inadequate to handle the Fleet;
the distance from the West Coast increased the cost and the
delay and the diffi culty of maintaining and supplying the Fleet;
that there were no recreational facilities; that in time of peace
the men and offi cers could not see any reason for remaining for
such a long time away from home; that they were two thousand
miles nearer a possible enemy; that we were unprepared to
undertake off ensive operations from Pearl Harbor, and that if
we were involved in war, it would be necessary for us to return
to the West Coast for stripping and mobilization and preparation
for war; and that our presence in the Hawaiian area, when
we were absolutely not trained, couldn’t make any military people
believe that we were planning off ensive operations. 41
In spite of Richardson’s objections, Stark had directed him
in May 1940 “to announce to the press that the Fleet would
remain in Hawaiian waters” at Richardson’s request “to carry out
exercises that [he] had in mind.” 42 Asked if he knew why Stark
had ordered the Fleet held in Hawaii, Richardson replied “For
the restraining infl uence it might exercise on the action of the
Japanese nation.” 43
When Richardson was still commander of the U.S. Fleet, he
had been warned several times that war was possible. He had
received
40Ibid., p. 628.
41Ibid., pp. 627–28.
42Ibid., p. 624.
43Ibid., p. 628.