Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

502 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
“agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar
number at Wake.” 37 Short had received a War Department
message along the same line, asking him “to relieve the marine
infantry units on the outlying islands with Army personnel.” 38
Th e “proximity of these two messages in point of time to the
war warning message . . . lessened the force of the war warning
message.” Apparently, Kimmel said, CNO Stark was “willing to
temporarily upset, to a considerable degree, the defenses of Pearl
Harbor as well as of the outlying bases” to reinforce Wake and
Midway, especially as the Navy was being asked to transport the
planes, ground crews, essential spare parts, tools, and ammunition.
Now, Kimmel said, “the diffi culties of reinforcing the outlying
stations were undoubtedly well-known to the Chief of Naval
Operations,” so that the War Department’s message “indicated a
confl ict betwixt the ideas of the War Department and the Navy
Department at that time.”
Pearl Harbor, U.S. Fleet’s Base,
Vulnerable to Attack
Th e NCI questioned Admiral James O. Richardson, Kimmel’s
predecessor as commander-in-chief of the U.S. Fleet at Pearl
Harbor. Richardson’s testimony revealed that he had also encountered
diffi culties in obtaining men and materiel, in conducting
reconnaissance, and in acquiring reliable information to guide
him in planning, training, and preparing for defense. 39 Richardson
had also objected to basing the fl eet at Pearl Harbor and had recommended
that it be headquartered on the West Coast, “except a
37 Ibid., part 33, p. 1177.
38 Ibid., part 32, p. 238.
39 Ibid., pp. 624, 629.