Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 501
Kimmel was asked about the last-minute December 7
Marshall-Stark dispatch stating that the Japanese ambassadors
“were presenting at 1:00 p.m. Eastern Standard time today what
amounts to an ultimatum.” Marshall had closed this dispatch by
saying, “Just what signifi cance the hour set may have we do not
know but be on alert accordingly.” 32 Th is message did not reach
Short and Kimmel until well after the attack. Devastated by the
disaster, Kimmel had told the courier then that “it wasn’t of the
slightest interest to me at that time, and I threw the thing in the
waste basket.” 33
Asked what diff erence it would have made had he received
the warning before the attack, Kimmel said two other factors were
more signifi cant. “One was that an ultimatum was being delivered.
Th e other was that . . . the Japanese Ambassador had instructions
from his government to deliver it at a specifi c time.” 34
Kimmel had been under orders “to permit Japan to commit
the fi rst overt act.” Technically, Kimmel said,
I could not fi re a shot at a Japanese Fleet until after they had
fi rst shot at us, and also, technically, had I sent out patrol planes
armed, I would have had to wait until the enemy fi red at these
patrol planes or committed some other overt act before I could
do anything more than protest. 35
Th e war-warning dispatch had given Kimmel “an excuse to do
something that I had wanted to do for several months . . . to
bomb submarine contacts.” 36
Kimmel considered his orders confusing. Just the day before
the “war warning,” Stark had advised him that the Army had
32Ibid., part 33, p. 1282.
33Ibid., part 32, p. 253.
34Ibid., p. 264.
35Ibid., p. 254.
36Ibid., p. 259.