Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

500 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
planes out in those conditions. . . . Whoever sent them out
felt that the hazard of carrying the ammunition was greater
than the hazard of a Japanese attack. In other words, he [the
dispatcher] considered that there was no probability of an air
attack at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 or the
planes would not have been started from Hamilton Field in
that condition, as late as they were. 29
Th en Kimmel himself spent three days on the witness stand,
August 15–17. He spoke about the Army’s responsibility for the
defense of the fl eet when in port, his training procedures, the possibility
of a submarine attack, and so on. Before the attack, he had
made frequent requests to Washington for information and had
received repeated assurances “that [he] would be kept informed.”
However, Kimmel felt sure that “there must be details [known in
Washington] about which [he] was not informed,” details about
which he “could only guess.” 30
Kimmel had known that both Marshall and Stark had recommended
against our issuing an ultimatum to the Japanese.
However, he did not know that when he received the November
27 “war warning,” the State Department had issued Japan an ultimatum
the day before. He had simply assumed that “one of the
primary causes for the [war warning] dispatch was, as stated, that
negotiations had ceased” and that U.S.-Japanese relations were
reaching a breaking point. Kimmel received no later message
from the CNO canceling or modifying the November 27 “war
warning.” As a result, when later press reports indicated that “further
conversations were continuing between the Japanese ambassadors
and the State Department, the warning lost much of its
force.” 31
29Ibid., part 32, p. 186.
30Ibid., p. 291.
31Ibid., p. 233.