Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 499
In answer to Kimmel’s repeated questioning, Schuirmann hesitated
and replied only that it “would involve the disclosure of
information detrimental to the public interest. . . . [H]e claimed
his privilege against revealing state secrets.” 25 Finally after
being recalled to testify after the court rescinded its earlier ruling
restricting questions on subjects not previously in evidence
before the court, 26 Schuirmann admitted having known about the
Japanese deadlines—November 25 and 29. 27 He also said the dispatch
directing the Japanese ambassadors to deliver their reply to
Hull on Sunday, December 7, at precisely 1:00 p.m. Washington
time, had been available by 9:30 a.m. when Stark reached his
offi ce. And Schuirmann also recalled the Marshall-Stark telephone
conversation concerning the last minute message to the
fi eld commanders. 28
Washington’s Advice to Pearl Harbor
Commanders Confusing, Conflicting
General Short, the Army’s commander at Pearl Harbor at
the time of the attack, was NCI’s next witness. Like Kimmel,
Short had been under a cloud of suspicion ever since the publication
of the Roberts Commission report. One of Short’s most
telling points was that the planes which had been en route to the
Philippines via Hawaii, the planes that had arrived over Hawaii
during the attack, had been sent out from California unarmed.
“As late as 1:30 a.m. in the War Department on December 7,”
when the planes were dispatched from California, Short said,
they did not believe there was any danger of air attack at
Honolulu, or they never would have been so rash as to send
25Ibid., p. 159.
26Ibid., part 33, pp. 732–33.
27Ibid., p. 733.
28Ibid., p. 759.