Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

496 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Short, protested to Naval Communications that Lavender’s access
to the secret fi les violated orders. When the director of naval
communications said he had received no such orders, McNarney
backed down. However, Admiral King, who had agreed to
Lavender’s examination, told Kimmel later that he would not
recommend making the information available. And then Naval
Communications refused to turn over to Lavender the copies of
the intercepts he had selected. 13 But Kimmel did not let the matter
rest. He asked the judge advocate to pursue the matter with
Navy secretary Forrestal, 14 who replied on August 10 that it was
“not in the public interest to introduce this type of material in
evidence. . . .” 15 However, Kimmel’s man had seen the intercepts.
So Kimmel persisted.
During the court’s fi rst 19 days, Kimmel made requests almost
daily to have the secret Japanese intercepts introduced in evidence.
Finally on the 20th day, August 28, Kimmel’s eff orts bore
fruit. Th e fi le copies of the selected documents, “duly authenticated
under offi cial seal,” were placed in the NCI’s record “at the
request of the judge advocate of this court.” 16 Th e remaining days
of the Inquiry, therefore, dealt with this new material. . However,
before getting to that, we should fi rst review briefl y the situation
before the intercepts were introduced.
CNO Harold R. Stark Doesn’t Recall
Pre-attack Details
Th e court’s fi rst witness, Chief of Naval Operations Stark 17
off ered no startling revelations. Stark held that he had sought
13 Ibid.
14 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 32, pp. 103–04.
15 Ibid., pp. 120–21.
16 Ibid., part 33, p. 735.
17 Ibid., part 32, pp. 11–152, 247–50, 527–38, 727–31.