Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

492 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short. 182
Th e APHB report then detailed the extent to which each shared
in the responsibility.
Th e report was submitted to Stimson only a couple of weeks
before the November 7 presidential election. Th e APHB had been
critical of Short, who was no longer on active duty. But it had also
criticized Secretary of State Hull, Army Chief of Staff Marshall,
and General Gerow, all of whom were still actively involved in
the administration and the war. Th e report’s release could prove
an embarrassment to the administration, the president, and the
war eff ort.
When Stimson received the report, it was announced in the
press that it would not be released until it had been “reviewed
for security by appropriate military authorities.” 183 Th en, on
December 1, after Roosevelt had won his election to a third term,
Stimson announced that
it would be highly prejudicial to the successful prosecution of
the war and the safety of American lives to make public during
the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the
record on which it is based.
Th us both secretaries, war and navy, refused “[o]n the ground of
national security . . . to make the real story of Pearl Harbor,” as
revealed in the NCI and APHB reports “public until the war had
ended.” 184
182 Ibid., pp. 175–76.
183 New York Times, October 24, 1944, p. 12, col. 2.
184 New York Times, December 2, 1944, pp. 1, 5.