Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

490 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
After the confl icting Navy and Army dispatches of November 27,
and the additional November 28 sabotage messages from Army
G-2 and from the adjutant general, 175
Short had only silence from Washington. He was given no further
clarifi cation of this confl ict amongst the messages. Th ere
is no explanation why Short was not told of the so-called
[November 26] ultimatum. It was known to the Japanese
because it was handed to them. 176
In its report, the APHB discussed the intelligence available
in Washington and Hawaii, the “amiable relationship” between
Short and Kimmel, 177 the warnings that had been sent to Hawaii,
the Hawaiian commanders’ defense plans, the Army’s radar facilities,
Short’s sabotage alert, the shortage of planes in Hawaii for
long-range reconnaissance, and so on.
As has been repeated so many times, there was positive evidence
in the War Department that it was only a matter of
days before war would ensue and the War Department had
notice that Hawaii was on only a sabotage alert, inadequate
for full warfare. Had a full war message, unadulterated, been
dispatched or had direct orders for a full, all-out alert been
sent, Hawaii could have been ready to have met the attack with
what it had. What resulted was failure at both ends of the line.
Responsibility laid both in Washington and in Hawaii. 178
Among other things, the APHB report criticized Marshall
“for not providing an arrangement by which another could act in
175 Ibid., part 14, p. 1406, Navy #272337; p. 1328, Army #472; p. 1329, Miles,
G-2, #473; and p. 1330, Army Adjutant General, #482.
176 Ibid., part 39, p. 141.
177 Ibid., p. 61.
178 Ibid., p. 145.