Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Army Pearl Harbor Board 489
the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of Navy, and the
Chief of Naval Operations. It was not a question of fact; it was
only a question of time. Th e next few days would see the end of
peace and the beginning of war.
If it be assumed that for any reason the information could
not have been given to the Hawaiian Department, then it was
a responsibility of the War Department to give orders to Short
what to do, and to tell him to go on an all-out alert instead of a
sabotage alert. 172 Th e board was especially concerned about the
warnings sent Short, his sabotage alert response to the November
27 warning, and the failure of Washington to respond.
Having asked for a report of what he was doing, the War
Department placed itself in the position of sharing the responsibility
if it did not direct Short to take such measures as they
considered adequate to meet this serious threat. 173
However, the APHB pointed out, Short “had two threats.”
Yet “he only took measures as to one.” Th e message on which he
particularly relied as to sabotage came from G-2 on November
28, the report said,
after he had made his decision to go to Alert Number 1. Th is
last message . . . does not in any way change previous messages.
Short should have known, as a trained soldier, that a G-2 message
is informative and is of lesser authority than a commanding
message from the Chief of Staff . 174
172 Ibid., part 39, p. 139.
173 Ibid., p. 90.
174 Ibid., p. 91.