Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

488 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Th e APHB issued a detailed report describing the background
of the attack, the situation in Washington and in Hawaii,
and the responsibilities of the several offi cials. It had brought out
in the course of its hearings several signifi cant points not previously
covered in depth:
a. Th e Army was clearly responsible for the defense of the
fl eet when it was at its home base in Pearl Harbor;
b. Given the instructions he had received, Short appeared justifi
ed in ordering Alert #1 for sabotage;
c. Short’s Washington superior commander, Marshall, was
obviously familiar with Short’s system of alerts and should
have notifi ed Short if his order for a sabotage alert, issued
in response to Washington’s November 27 warning, was not
considered adequate;
d. Short had been told very little about the crisis that
Washington offi cialdom knew was looming;
e. Th e attack on Pearl Harbor apparently took everyone by surprise,
not only in Hawaii but also in Washington. Offi cials
both in Washington and Hawaii had expected the fi rst
Japanese strike would be in the western Pacifi c or southeast
Asia and, quite likely, the Phillippines.
f. Two witnesses—Kimmel and Saff ord—revealed that, as
a result of decoded Japanese intercepts, Washington offi -
cials had had access to considerable intelligence concerning
Japanese intentions, which was not furnished the Hawaiian
commanders.
Th e APHB was impressed by the quantity and quality of the
intelligence available in Washington. Th e record shows that from
informers and other sources the War Department had complete
and detailed information of Japanese intentions. Information of
the evident Japanese intention to go to war in the very near future
was well known to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War,