Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Army Pearl Harbor Board 487
clock on the wall and at my watch.” Th e long Japanese reply was
on Marshall’s desk when he came in. Marshall read it and then “a
discussion of the entire communication” ensued. 168
Bratton urged the APHB to obtain, not only the Japanese
reply to the U.S. November 26 “ultimatum,” but also
the 30 or 40 other messages which preceded it; that is, the
exchanges between the Ambassador in Washington and the
foreign minister in Tokyo. . . . And consider the picture that lay
before all of our policy-making and planning offi cials, from the
Secretary of State down through the Secretary of War, to the
Chief of the War Plans Division. Th ey all had the same picture;
and it was a picture that was being painted over a period of
weeks, if not months. 169
APHB Obtains Japanese Intercepts – Finally!
On October 6, 1944, the board gained access to the 45 to 50
intercepts requested. 170
After it actually had the intercepts in hand, it questioned a
few fi nal witnesses and then its proceedings were concluded.
The Army Pearl Harbor Board Report
Th e APHB’s hearings and those of the NCI had run concurrently,
the NCI from July 24 through September 27, 1944, the
APHB from August 7 through October 6. Th e NCI report was
dated October 19, that of the APHB, October 20, 1944. 171
168Ibid., pp. 2419, 2420, 2422.
169Ibid., p. 2424.
170Ibid., p. 2449. For list of documents, see ibid., pp. 2456–57; for documents
themselves, see part 31, pp. 3235–58.
171Ibid., part 39, pp. 23–178, APHB Report, October 20, 1944; ibid., pp.
179–230, Appendix to Report; ibid., pp. 231–69, Judge Advocate General
(Major General) Myron C. Cramer’s analyses.