Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

28 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
advantage called for making adjustments that would result in losing
three to six weeks out of a tightly scheduled training year.
Richardson felt that the Navy Department had placed him,
the commander-in-chief of the United States Fleet, “in a completely
false position, with a requirement that he announce to the
public something which, on its very face, every tyro ensign would
recognize as a phony.” 51 He was even more disturbed by the cable
he received from Washington a week later reporting on the war
in Europe and concluding:
PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT FLEET WILL
REMAIN HAWAIIAN WATERS FOR SOME TIME. 52
Richardson was very much opposed to retaining the fl eet in
Hawaii. He went to Washington several weeks later to explain his
reasons to the president in person.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., p. 311. Th e complete cable read as follows:
FROM: OPNAV [Offi ce, Chief of Naval Operations]
TO: CINCUS [Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet]
SOME BRITISH AUTHORITIES FEEL THAT ITALY MAY JOIN
GERMANY IN ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN IMMEDIATE
FUTURE x THIS FEELING IS NOT SHARED BY OTHER
CLOSE OBSERVERS X OUR STATE DEPARTMENT INCLINED
TO DISAGREE x REGARDING DUTCH EAST INDIES JAPAN
HAS MADE TWO STATEMENTS WHICH IF TAKEN AT THEIR
FACE VALUE STATE THEY WISH STATUS QUO PRESERVED
x GREAT BRITAIN HAS STATED SHE HAS NO INTENTION
OF INTERFERING WITH STATUS QUO AND THERE IS AN
UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT THE FRENCH FOREIGN
OFFICE HAS ISSUED A SIMILAR STATEMENT x PRESENT
INDICATIONS ARE THAT FLEET WILL REMAIN HAWAIIAN
WATERS FOR SOME TIME x HOPE TO ADVISE YOU MORE
DEFINITELY NEXT WEEK x