Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

486 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
period of time Rochefort could tell Colonel Fielder, our G-2,
exactly what was going on and what we knew.” Th us Bratton
tried by this indirect route to communicate his fears to Army’s
G-2 in Hawaii. 163
When delivering the Japanese intercepts, Bratton’s usual
practice was to go fi rst to Marshall, Miles, and Gerow, and then
to the State Department. He had followed this procedure the
evening of December 6, when delivering the fi rst 13 parts of the
Japanese reply. Bratton said he “very seldom” delivered the locked
pouch of intercepts to Marshall in person. Th at evening he had
left the “locked bag” containing Marshall’s copy with his secretary,
Colonel Bedell Smith, advising him “that it was an important
document. . . and that the Chief of Staff . . . [s]hould see it
right away.” 164
Bratton had then made delivery in person to G-2’s Miles,
with whom he had discussed the message at some length. 165 He
had left the copy of the message for Gerow with his “executive
offi cer,” Colonel Gailey. 166 Th en, at about 10 or 10:30 Bratton
had gone with the 13-part message to the Department of State,
where he had delivered the locked pouch “to the watch offi cer in
the State Department, with the request that it be gotten to Mr.
Hull immediately.” 167
Th e next morning, after receiving the last installment of the
Japanese reply and the 1:00 p.m. deadline message at about 8:30–
9:00 a.m., Bratton spent a couple of frantic hours trying to locate
Marshall. When he fi nally reached him by phone, Marshall asked
Bratton to wait for him at his offi ce. Marshall arrived at 11:25
a.m.; Bratton was sure of the time because he “kept looking at the
163Ibid., p. 2444.
164Ibid., part 29, pp. 2421–23.
165Ibid., p. 2422.
166Ibid., p. 2421.
167Ibid., pp. 2422, 2419.