Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Army Pearl Harbor Board 485
Department,” 158 being held in tight security and “will be made
available to you later.” 159
Bratton had been convinced on December 3 that war with
Japan was imminent. On that day a December 2 message from
Tokyo directing the Japanese embassy in Washington to burn its
codes, to stop using their code machine, and to destroy it completely,
had been translated. 160 “After the receipt of this translation,”
Bratton said, “any further intercepts that were brought to
me would simply contribute toward the climax that I saw coming.
Th is was it.” 161 He “had a feeling that further warnings or alerts
should be sent out to our overseas commands. Gerow felt that
suffi cient warning had been sent. Miles thought he couldn’t go
over Gerow’s decision” because of the War Department policy
then in eff ect that War Department G-2 (Intelligence) should
not send out any intelligence to the G-2s of tactical commands
or overseas departments “which might produce an operational
reaction, without the complete concurrence of the War Plans
Division.” 162
Bratton “still felt uneasy” and thought “further warnings
should be sent out.” He went to the Navy Department to see
Commander McCollum, head of the Far Eastern Section in
ONI. McCollum felt as Bratton did and was going to write up
a warning and “try to get the Chief of Naval Operations to dispatch
it.” McCollum told Bratton also that the Navy’s “S.I.S. man
in Honolulu, a Commander Rochefort . . . had all the information
that we had, and was listening for this Japanese winds-weather
broadcast.” McCollum suggested that Bratton instruct Army’s
G-2 in Hawaii to talk with Rochefort at once, “as in a short
158Ibid., part 29, p. 2417.
159Ibid., p. 2416.
160Ibid., part 12, p. 215; part 31, p. 3250.
161Ibid., part 29, p. 2442.
162Ibid., pp. 2444, 2453.