Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

484 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
I remember very distinctly the message from Colonel Bratton
because it came to me as I was coming out of a shower, as my
habit was to ride at 8:30 on Sunday morning, and it takes me
about fi fty minutes to go around the only available loop to ride
in. It takes me about eight or ten minutes to get a shower and
dress. And when the message came from Colonel Bratton he
wanted to come out there, and I said, “No. I am on my way
down to the War Department.” And it couldn’t have been more
than fi ve or ten minutes at the outside before I had left to come
down here. I have a very clear recollection of that because naturally
I thought about it at the time. . . . I was not aware of the
fact that this message had been available the night before. 155
Marshall concluded his testimony with a further comment
on the importance of secrecy. “[E]verybody that is concerned
with this top secret thing is very cagey about saying anything
about it.” 156 Th is, he implied, explained the reluctance of the War
Department to release TOP SECRET intercepts to those investigating
the Pearl Harbor attack.
Army Courier Bratton Reports
His Deliveries of Japanese Intercepts
Now that more information about the Japanese intercepts
had come out, Bratton returned twice more to testify
—October 2 and 6. He said the secret “Summary of Far Eastern
Documents,” 157 copies of the translated Japanese intercepts documenting
the “Summary,” together with an Appendix containing
many of the crucial Japanese intercepts, were “on fi le in G-2, War
155 Ibid., pp. 2409–11.
156Ibid., p. 2413.
157Ibid., part 31, pp. 3201–35, Exhibit A to Army Pearl Harbor Board Top
Secret Transcript: Summary of Far Eastern Documents; and pp. 3235–58,
Exhibit B to Army Pearl Harbor Board Top Secret Transcript. Exhibit consists
of copies of the 45–50 most important documents themselves.