Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

482 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
the department’s November 26, 1941, memorandum, or “ultimatum,”
rejecting Japan’s proposal for a modus vivendi. Nor did he
remember Secretary of State Hull’s remark to Secretary of War
Stimson the next morning to the eff ect that Hull had broken off
discussions with the Japanese: “I have washed my hands of it and
it is now in the hands of you [Stimson] and Knox, the Army and
Navy.” 147 Marshall admitted, however, that he
must have known on the 26th of November that the negotiations
were nearing an impasse, because Admiral Stark and
I evidently directed the preparation of a draft of the 27th of
November warning on that day, the 26th. 148
Marshall didn’t remember the War Department’s November
27 warning to Short (#472) advising that “Negotiations with
Japan appear to be terminated” and asking Short to “report
measures taken.” 149 Nor did he remember Short’s “sabotage
alert” reply (#959). And he had not realized that his failure to
respond to Short’s sabotage alert, admittedly inappropriate for
defense against attack, meant that it had “obtained during the
entire period 27 November–6 December inclusive.” Marshall was
forced to admit that Washington’s November 27 warning “did
not accomplish the desired results” 150 of defending Pearl Harbor
against attack.
Perhaps most astonishing of all, however, was that Marshall
still maintained that he had heard nothing at all prior to the
morning of December 7 about the Japanese reply to the U.S.
November 26 “ultimatum.” Th is in spite of the fact that the fi rst
13 parts of that reply had been delivered to the White House and
the State Department and were “in the hands of some agency
147 Ibid., p. 2402.
148 Ibid., p. 2405.
149 Ibid., p. 2402.
150 Ibid., pp. 2404–05.