Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

480 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Commander-in-Chief Pacifi c Fleet or Commander-in-Chief
Asiatic Fleet until 48 hours after we had the news. 143
Saff ord had recognized the signifi cance of the “Winds Code
Execute” at the time. However, his responsibilities were limited
to communications security. “Th e evaluation [of a message] was
out of my hands, and that is a function of Naval Intelligence.” 144
Th us, Saff ord had focused his December 4 messages to the naval
attachés necessarily on the issue of security.
Grunert then turned to another subject. Saff ord had “indicated
. . . that at sometime in the not too distant past it was not
intended to give the Navy Court of Inquiry and the Army Board
certain secret information.” Had special instructions been issued
to that eff ect?
Th at was “rather a long story,” Saff ord said. He explained
that Kimmel had asked to see the Hart report. On the basis of
information revealed there, Kimmel had requested permission
for his counsel, Captain Lavender, “to inspect all the fi les out at
20G, communications intelligence fi les, to see what information
had been in existence in the Navy Department.” Lavender had
been permitted to see the fi les and had then asked for copies
of about 60 messages. Th e department had assembled the intercepts,
turned them over to the director of naval communications,
and notifi ed S.I.S. S.I.S. had protested. Th e assistant secretary of
the Navy, Ralph A. Bard, had also disapproved of their release.
But when Navy Secretary Forrestal, then in London, returned
to Washington, he reversed that decision and directed that the
intercepts be made available to the NCI. But the APHB had not
obtained copies. Saff ord suggested they put in a request to the
secretary of the Navy. 145
143Ibid., pp. 2396–97.
144Ibid., p. 2379.
145Ibid., p. 2375.