Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Army Pearl Harbor Board 479
By “this other stuff ,” Saff ord meant “the declaration of war,”
i.e., the 14-part reply to our “ultimatum” that the Japanese sent
December 6–7, and their December 7 “One p.m. Message.” Th at,
Saff ord said, “is in their [high-class, “purple”] machine which
they think no one can read, and they are still talking their fool
heads off in it, particularly from Germany.” 141
Even though the “Winds Execute” had been sent in the
“low-grade” cipher, Saff ord said it was extremely signifi cant.
By announcing the imminence of a break in relations, or of
an outbreak of war, with the United States and Britain, Japan
was explaining the reason for her November 25 deadline, later
changed to November 29. And the deadline showed that the
break in relations it portended was not just talk. Th us the “Winds
Execute” “made the deadline message mean a lot more, and the
deadline message made that [the Winds Code Execute] mean a
lot more.” 142
Saff ord told the APHB that we knew from Japanese intercepts
picked up December 1 and 3, 1941 that Japanese embassies
and consulates in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila,
Batavia, and Washington had been told to destroy their codes,
ciphers, and code machines. “[T]his destruction of codes immediately
threw the ‘Winds’ message into prominence,” Saff ord said.
141 Ibid.
Before, we couldn’t understand why they had this [“Winds
Code”] setup arranged. It seemed a foolish thing to do . . .
but they had this in mind, I think: Well, all right, one step
short of war. Th ey are destroying their codes to play safe, but
they are still reserving the decision as to peace or war to come
in the “Winds” message, which was the reason that, from
the fi rst on, we thought the “Winds” message was so highly
important, and yet that information did not get out to either
142 Ibid., p. 2370.