Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

476 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Operations.” 132 Russell asked Saff ord about his statement before
Hart’s investigation that we had received on November 26 “specifi
c evidence of Japan’s intentions to wage an off ensive war
against both Britain and the United States.” Saff ord replied that
this message, S.I.S. No. 25392,
said that Japan would announce her intentions in regard to
war or possibly breaking off diplomatic relations with Russia,
England including the Netherlands East Indies, and the United
States by means of a word sent fi ve times in the middle and at
the end of their information broadcast.
Saff ord continued, “On November 28th, 1941, we read another
message . . . giving a ‘Winds’ code to be used in their voice
broadcasts.” 133 We had verifi cation of this “Winds Code” setup
from other sources—Hart (Manila), Singapore, Batavia (NEI),
and our intercept station in the state of Washington. 134
Russell: [T]ell us about the follow-up on this code . . . whether
or not on or about December 4th you did receive information
which indicated that the Japanese Empire had employed
this code and the intercepted messages indicated fi nal decisions
aff ecting the United States, Russia, Britain; one or more
of these powers.
Saff ord: Yes, sir, we did. Th at was received in the morning of
Th ursday, December 4, 1941. It was received about 8:00. . . by
teletype. I saw it when I fi rst came to the offi ce . . . the writing
at the bottom in lead pencil in Kramer’s handwriting, “War
with England, war with America, peace with Russia.” Th e
message as received was not the way we expected it, because
132 Ibid., pp. 2362, 2367.
133 Ibid., pp. 2367–68.
134 Ibid., pp. 2368–71.