Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

474 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
off ered to bring it out to Marshall’s quarters. Marshall told him
to report to him in his offi ce. 124
Marshall arrived in his offi ce at “about 11:25.” Th en fi nally,
almost three hours after this “message of extreme importance”
had been received, Bratton was able to show it to Marshall.
Marshall discussed it with Bratton, Miles, and Gerow, who were
present. Th ey “thought it probable that the Japanese line of action
would be into Th ailand but that it might be into any one or more
of a number of other areas.” 125 Marshall then radioed the Army
fi eld commanders “by the fastest possible safe means, giving the
Philippines fi rst priority,” 126 advising them of the 1 p.m. deadline,
and telling them to “be on the alert accordingly.” 127 Th is was the
message that reached Pearl Harbor in the afternoon, hours after
the attack had ended.
Th e APHB wanted to know whether or not the “Winds Code”
setup had ever been “executed,” i.e., implemented. Bratton had
known that the FCC had been looking for such a message and he
remembered talking about weather messages with Colonel Sadtler,
Navy Lieutenant Kramer and Navy Commander McCollum. But
his memory was vague. He did remember talking with Sadtler on
the morning of December 5, who said something about a message
that had come through indicating a break between Japan and
Great Britain. Bratton did not remember seeing before the attack
an implementation, a “Winds Code” Execute, with reference to
a Japanese-United States break. 128 However, he did remember,
vaguely, seeing a “Winds Execute” referring to a Japanese-U.S.
break in relations after the attack. 129
124 Ibid., p. 2346.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid., p. 2344.
127 Ibid., part 14, p. 1334, Marshall radio message #529 to Hawaii.
128 Ibid., part 29, pp. 2338, 2341.
129 Ibid., p. 2341.