Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Army Pearl Harbor Board 473
the president, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War,
the Chief, the AC of S G-2, and the Chief of the War Plans
Division all saw the same material, they all read the same translations,
as fast as I could get them to them. 121
Th ese materials
did not go out to the fi eld. . . . We felt considerably hampered
in G-2 by two restrictions that were placed upon us. Th e fi rst I
have mentioned as the policy which prevented us from giving
out intelligence to G-2s in tactical units or in overseas department,
which might have the eff ect of bringing about operational
results. Th e other restriction was imposed on us by the
Navy, who refused to allow us to send any of this intercept
intelligence out to any of our people in the fi eld over Army net,
using any Army code cipher . . . fear of the Japanese breaking
our Army code, and fi nding out that we were reading their
own. It was a security measure. 122
Bratton testifi ed that on the morning of December 7, between
8:30 and 9:00 a.m., he had received the short Japanese Englishlanguage
intercept “relating to the destruction of the code
machines and the delivery of the ultimatum.” He realized this was
“about the most important message” he had received during this
period and immediately phoned Marshall’s quarters. 123 Bratton
was told Marshall “had gone horseback riding.” He “requested his
[Marshall’s] orderly to go out and fi nd him at once and ask him
to call . . . as soon as practicable, as [he] had an important message
to deliver to him.” In spite of the urgency of the message, it
was not until “sometime between ten and eleven” that Marshall
returned Bratton’s call. Bratton then told Marshall that he “had a
message of extreme importance which he should see at once” and
121 Ibid., p. 2451.
122 Ibid., p. 2453
123 Ibid., pp. 2344–45.