Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

470 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
According to Marshall, he had come to the conclusion about
November 1 that war with Japan was inevitable. Concerning the
TOP SECRET information known to top Washington offi cials,
he admitted that to have sent this intelligence to the commanding
generals of the overseas departments “by courier or otherwise,
thereby avoiding the danger of exposing the codes that I was
striving so diligently to protect,” would have been “both practical
and feasible.” On the morning of December 7, when confronted
with incontestable evidence that Japan was planning some defi -
nite action that very day at 1:00 p.m. Washington time, Marshall
said it would have been possible to notify the commanders by a
more rapid method than the coded radio message actually dispatched
at noon that day. But he felt then that that would have
been “unwise.” 109 Moreover, Marshall was convinced that Short
had been sent “suffi cient information” and that he had “adequate
weapons, ammunition, and other means for the discharge of his
defensive mission in the protection of the Island of Oahu.” 110
Marshall apologized for not being better prepared to answer
the board’s questions, but as chief of staff he had been “busy with
the war with Japan and Germany” and had not been able to keep
up on the Pearl Harbor situation. 111
Th ere were still more questions the board wanted to pursue
with Marshall, who pleaded pressure of other business—
appointments with a Chinese offi cial, the combined Chiefs of
Staff , the U.S. Chiefs of Staff , the ambassador going to France.
And “confi dentially” he was leaving for France himself the next
Tuesday. 112 Grunert said if it “appears necessary,” the Board might
ask Marshall for “another hour early next week.” 113 Th e next day,
109Ibid., p. 2328.
110Ibid., pp. 2313, 2319.
111Ibid., p. 2329.
112Ibid., pp. 2329–30.
113 Ibid.