Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Army Pearl Harbor Board 469
However, he admitted that it did appear “from the record,”
that “a Japanese message using the ‘Winds’ code had been intercepted.”
Th is indicated, Marshall said, that “Japanese-Great
Britain relations were to be broken.” Marshall didn’t mention a
possible break in Japanese-U.S. relations. 104 Russell noted this was
the Army interpretation. He said,
Th e Navy people say that the executive order [the “Winds
Execute”] whenever it came in—and they alleged it came in on
the 3rd [sic] of December . . . meant that war was coming with
the United States and with Britain, but not with Russia. 105
Marshall had understood from Bratton that the intelligence offi -
cers in Hawaii were privy to the information about the “Winds
Code” message. 106
Another important matter which Marshall did not remember
related to the fi rst 13 parts of the Japanese reply to our “ultimatum.”
According to Kimmel’s statement, they were received
during the evening of December 6. Marshall said was he was
unaware of this. 107
Responding to Grunert’s question as to when on December 7
Marshall had learned “the precise time of the attack,” he reviewed
his December 7 morning movements—his early horseback ride;
his arrival at his War Department offi ce about 11 a.m.; his meeting
with Miles, Gerow, and Bratton; his discovery of the long
14-part Japanese message; and, fi nally, the “One p.m. Message.”
“Something was going to happen at 1:00, it was quite evident to
us.” After digesting all this material, Marshall drafted the message
that went out to the fi eld commanders at noon. 108
104Ibid., p. 2324.
105Ibid., pp. 2323, 2325.
106Ibid., pp. 2324–25.
107Ibid., p. 2320.
108Ibid., pp. 2310, 2311.