Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

468 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
they could safely declare war, involve us in war, and get all the
other things they were after.” 100
By the fall of 1941, Marshall said, he had come to the conclusion
that war with Japan was inevitable. “Prudence dictated
that warnings be sent by the War Department to those offi cers
responsible for the defense of all our areas within reach of Japanese
action.” However, information available in the War Department
led him to believe that any Japanese attack would take place in
the vicinity of the Malay Peninsula and the Philippines. 101 He
wasn’t particularly concerned about Hawaii, especially as he considered
it better supplied and better prepared to defend itself than
other U.S. outposts. 102
APHB board member General Russell questioned Marshall
on various points Kimmel had raised. Marshall admitted to having
no recollection of the several advanced warnings received in
Washington. He did not recall having learned that November 29,
Tokyo time, “was defi nitely the governing date for off ensive military
operations of some nature.” He had no recollection of any
messages on November 26, December 1, and December 4 giving
“specifi c evidence of Japan’s intention to wage an off ensive war
against both Britain and the United States.” 103
Marshall recalled something about a “Winds Code” setup
and the alerting of our code clerks to listen for the crucial words.
But, he said,
Colonel Bratton was unable to fi nd that a—our records do
not show that a Japanese message using the “Winds” code was
intercepted by the F.C.C. or the Army Signal Corps until after
Pearl Harbor.
100Ibid., p. 2326.
101Ibid., p. 2328.
102Ibid., pp. 2317, 2318.
103Ibid., p. 2321.