Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Army Pearl Harbor Board 467
they could take advantage of that by doing things that otherwise
would immediately provoke a state of war. 98
Th roughout November, Marshall and Stark were urging the
administration to postpone any confrontation with the Japanese
until they could build up their Philippine defenses. Th e British,
preoccupied at home with their struggle against Germany, were
overextended and wanted to avoid open confl ict with the Japanese.
Yet the embargo on oil to Japan, with the cooperation of the
British and Dutch, imperiled the Japanese. Also the reopening
of the Burma Road by the British made it easier for China to
be provisioned, and this was a thorn in the side of the Japanese.
Marshall said he believed that the Japanese
were going ahead to get in as strong a position as possible, on
the assumption that the reluctance of the United States and
the reluctance of the British Government in its dilemma of the
moment would permit them to establish themselves. 99
He thought
the Japanese were capitalizing on the belief that it would be
very diffi cult to bring our people into a willingness to enter the
war. Th at, incidentally, was somewhat confi rmed by the governmental
policy on our part of making certain that the overt act
should not be attributed to the United States, because of the
state of public mind at that time. Of course, no one anticipated
that that overt act would be the crippling of the Pacifi c Fleet.
Marshall believed “Th at the Japanese were going to take every
conceivable advantage and fi nally would reach the point where
98 Ibid., pp. 2308–09.
99 Ibid., p. 2309.