Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

26 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Upon the defeat of France in June 1940 by the Nazis, the
Japanese began negotiations with the Vichy government of unoccupied
France to obtain permission to send troops to French
Indochina in order to prevent aid from reaching China by that
route. Th e weak Vichy government, in no position to protest,
fi nally gave permission on September 23. Th e Japanese occupation
of French Indochina then began with the arrival of 6,000
Japanese soldiers.
Japan joined the Axis Powers on September 27, 1940, when
she entered into a Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. All
three nations pledged total aid to each other if any one of the
three were attacked by a third party with which they were not
then at war. German and Japanese relations with the U.S.S.R.
were not to be aff ected.
Th e British were anxious to avoid war with Japan at almost
any price. Th ey realized their territories in southeast Asia were
vulnerable if Japanese forces should move into Indochina. But
rather than trying to appease Japan into not striking, which they
felt would be interpreted as weakness, they determined to show
fi rmness. Both the United States and Britain decided that the
best way to oppose Japan was to strengthen and encourage China.
Britain decided in January 1941 to enter into closer relations with
Chiang so that, if war came, Chiang would help Britain in Burma
and Hong Kong. 47
Th e U.S. government made $100 million available to Chiang
in December 1940 and promised him also a supply of up-todate
fi ghter planes. Britain even though strapped fi nancially,
contributed £5 million to the Chinese Currency Stabilization
Fund and granted export credits to China up to a maximum of
£3 million. 48
47 S. Woodburn Kirby, Major-General, Th e War Against Japan: Th e Loss of Singapore
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Offi ce, 1957), vol. 1, p. 53.
48 Ibid., p. 58.