Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

466 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
that you have been appropriately warned relating to the military
security concerning these matters.” 96
Marshall Remembers Some Events,
Does Not Recall Others
When Marshall appeared before the board again, he was
asked about the questions in Grunert’s letter of August 31, 1944. 97
Marshall was asked about the Japanese-imposed deadlines—
November 25 at fi rst, then November 29. “[T]he fi rst date of the
25th of November . . . puzzled us greatly,” Marshall said.
[T]he only thing that we could think of at the moment was . . .
that on that day the anti-Comintern pact expired. . . . During
all this period the Japanese had been involved in actions in the
China theater and towards Indo-China, which indicated . . .
that they were either about to embark on a war in the Malaysia
area, at least, or were in the process of carrying out very dire
infi ltration operations. . . . However, we later received information
from our secret sources . . . that the date had been extended
to the 29th of November. Th at, in our view, wiped out any
thought that the original date of the 25th of November pertained
to the anti-Comintern pact. . . . November 29th arrived
and passed, and we entered into December without anything
happening other than the continuation of these movements,
which we could follow fairly well, down the China coast and
Indo-China and headed quite plainly towards Th ailand and
the Gulf of Siam.
[I]n all the past procedures of the Japanese, they had taken very
bold measures . . . on the assumption, I presume—that they
could get away with them without the United States entering
into war. Th eir feeling, so nearly as we could determine, was
one that the United States would not participate in a war and
96Ibid., pp. 2437–38.
97Ibid., pp. 2330–31, Grunert August 31, 1944, letter to Marshall.