Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Army Pearl Harbor Board 465
(2) What new intelligence had prompted Marshall to send
the message concerning the Japanese delivery time to the fi eld
commanders at noon on December 7? 88
(3) What were the grounds for Kimmel’s statement to the
board about information available in Washington during the
crucial days before the attack, information not furnished Short
and Kimmel? 89
Short was anxious to learn about the coded messages. He
had written Stimson that very day “asking that a search be made
. . . and that, if it [the information] is not to be found in the
War Department fi les, that a demand be made on the Navy for
the information. . . .” 90 Short felt that “all pertinent evidence”
should be made available to the board and to him, because the
War Department had not permitted him to have a representative
attend the APHB hearings and examine witnesses. 91 However,
Short’s path to securing this information wasn’t easy. When he
wrote Secretary of War Stimson later (September 29, 1944) asking
for permission to see the SECRET documents, 92 Stimson
agreed that Short’s military counsel, Brigadier General Th omas
H. Green, should have access to this material (October 2, 1944). 93
Grunert tried to countermand that permission, 94 but the War
Department refused. Grunert was told to “comply with the
instructions of the Secretary of War as issued” 95 and to allow
Green to see the TOP SECRET material. But Short was not
allowed access. Green was even asked to sign a letter “swear[ing]
88Ibid., part 29, p. 2257.
89Ibid., p. 2258.
90Ibid., p. 2259.
91Ibid., pp. 2434–35.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., p. 2435.
94 Ibid., p. 2436.
95 Ibid., pp. 2436–37.