Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

464 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
“actions speak louder than words,” he pointed to Washington’s
pre-attack actions. He reminded the board of Washington’s
constant denials of requests for increases in personnel, for
money for the improvement of defenses; and things like sending
out planes [from California] the night before the attack
without ammunition—all kinds of things, that really were
stronger in their eff ect than mere words.
Assuming “that they were acting in good faith,” Short continued,
“you have to arrive at the conclusion that they undoubtedly
were not contemplating an air attack on Honolulu.” 85
Th e Army had also been considered negligent because its radar
was not operational and had not warned of the impending attack
that morning. Th at was not due to the command’s negligence.
Rather, Short said, it was due to “a shortage of supplies for the
radar, such as vacuum tubes, and so forth.” In an October 1941
memorandum radar equipment had been requested adequate to
operate 24 hours daily, but it had been radically cut back to allow
only two hours of operation per day. Why? Because, according to
the War Department, “the United States was not threatened with
attack.” 86
Short raised three important questions:
(1) Had the APHB learned anything about the coded messages
several witnesses had mentioned? For instance, what was
the basis for Justice Roberts’s question concerning
A Japanese code message . . . intercepted and . . . broken down
by the Department in Washington . . . which gave certain key
words which would be fl ashed over the radio directing the
attack on Pearl Harbor? 87
85Ibid., p. 2254.
86Ibid., part 29, p. 2261 (Powell October 1941 memo to Short).
87Ibid., p. 2255. In part 10, Short read from the testimony before the Roberts
Commission of Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, assistant to the
department G-2 in Honolulu; part 22, p. 192.