Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Army Pearl Harbor Board 463
And he reminded the board, there were “not only the embargoes,
but also the freezing order and the denunciation of our treaty and
commerce with Japan.” 80
Grew thought the attack must have been a surprise also to the
civil authorities in Japan. It was “perfectly possible,” he said, “that
the Cabinet was not informed of the plans for attacking Pearl
Harbor.” 81 He had had a conversation with Foreign Minister
Togo at half past midnight on December 7—about three hours
before the attack—and was “convinced from the nature of that
conversation that Mr. Togo did not at that moment know that
Pearl Harbor was about to break.” Grew added:
Th at does not for a moment mean that they were not informed
of the likelihood that under certain circumstances war might
occur. Of course, they knew that, without any shadow of doubt,
and Nomura and Kurusu knew that, too. I was referring purely
to the attack on Pearl Harbor, itself. 82
General Short Raises More Questions
After Short appeared before the APHB, he asked to be
furnished the testimony of other witnesses and the board had
agreed. 83 When he appeared again on September 29, 84 he said he
was concerned about the criticism levied against the Hawaiian
commanders because the attack had taken them by surprise. Th ey
were not the only ones surprised; he was convinced the attack had
been a surprise to Washington offi cials also. On the theory that
80 Ibid., p. 2152.
81 Ibid., p. 2151.
82 Ibid., p. 2154.
83Ibid., p. 2270, Major General Ulio, adjutant general, August 24, 1944,
response to Short.
84Ibid., p. 2251, Grunert statement.