Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

462 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
winding up its hearings. In view of the sensitivity of this material,
and to safeguard the confi dentiality of witnesses, their remarks
were not included in the regular printed hearings but placed in a
separate TOP SECRET supplement. 77
Ambassador Grew Describes
the Tokyo Situation
Joseph C. Grew had been U.S. ambassador to Japan from June
14, 1932, until December 7. Once the two nations were at war,
he was placed under house arrest and held until an exchange of
diplomats could be arranged. Grew was questioned about U.S.-
Japanese relations in general. “[T]he trend of our relations during
. . . the years 1940 and 1941 was almost steadily down-hill.” Grew
thought that in the embassy they had done everything possible
to arrest that trend. . . . But we were up against what I would
call a “tidal wave” of military extremism in Japan. . . . [N]ot
being a defeatist by nature, I was unwilling to admit that war
was inevitable, up to the last minute. 78
Grew had warned Washington that economic embargoes
should not be imposed
until we were prepared to go all the way through with whatever
might result from those embargoes. . . . [O]ur relations with
that country were bound to go steadily down-hill and it might,
and probably would, end in war. 79
77Ibid., part 29, pp. 2333–57.
78Ibid., pp. 2143–44.
79Ibid., p. 2144.