Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

460 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
to the president by General Marshall and Admiral Stark that
no ultimatum of any kind should be made to Japan.
Kimmel said he “had been advised of this recommendation and
had received no qualifi cation of that information.” Moreover, he
said he had “had no knowledge of the delivery of the ultimatum
to Japan on 26 November, 1941.” 68
Further, Kimmel said, he was
certain that several days prior to 7 December, 1941, there was
information in the War Department and the Navy Department
that Japan would attack the United States and, very probably,
that the attack would be directed against the fl eet at Pearl
Harbor, among other places; that there was information in the
War and Navy Departments on 6 December, 1941, that the
hour of attack was momentarily imminent, and that early on
7 December, 1941, the precise time of the attack was known.
It was known at least three or probably four hours before the
attack. 69
All this information, Kimmel said, “was denied” to him and
to Short, yet he felt they were entitled to it. He had believed that
if the War and Navy departments had had such information, they
would surely have furnished it to them.
Had we not been denied this, many things would have been
diff erent. Had we been furnished this information as little as
two or three hours before the attack, which was easily feasible
and possible,
Kimmel said, “much could have been done.” 70
When Kimmel fi nished his statement, Grunert said, “Some
of the things to which you have referred may become the subject
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., p. 947.
70 Ibid.