Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Army Pearl Harbor Board 459
then discussed intelligence. He said he “got information from the
Navy Department . . . so far as the effi ciency of the Japanese Air
Force [was] concerned.” But his sources had then been limited for
he could not “send people to the Mandated Islands to discover
what the Japanese were doing” there. His
orders were not to go anywhere near them. . . . We wanted to go
into the Gilberts to make some surveys down there . . . and the
answer was that we should not evince any interest in the Gilberts,
because the Japs might fi nd out that we were interested. 65
In any event, Kimmel said, “A movement such as that would
have had to be approved by the Navy Department.” Kimmel was
“convinced that no reconnaissance of the Mandates would have
been permitted by the Navy Department at that time.” 66 He had
a statement to make about “the information which was supplied
to the two responsible commanders in Hawaii.” He and Short
had “thoroughly considered all such information” and had taken
“the action which we deemed appropriate. Th ere was no disagreement
between the Army and Navy and none between me and my
personal advisers.” 67
However, Kimmel said,
Since Pearl Harbor information has come to my knowledge
that vital information in the hands of the War and Navy
Departments was not supplied to responsible offi cers in Hawaii;
in particular, that the War and Navy Departments knew that
Japan had set a deadline of 25 November, later extended to 29
November for the signing of an agreement, after which they
would take hostile steps against the United States; that on 26
November an ultimatum was delivered to Japan by the United
States. Th is was done notwithstanding a joint recommendation
65 Ibid., p. 944; part 29, pp. 2279–81.
66 Ibid., part 28, p. 945.
67 Ibid., p. 946.