Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

458 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
of the information contained in the Chief of Staff ’s radiogram
of 7 December 1941.” 61 Marshall said that if he had used the
scrambler phone to relay that message he “would certainly have
called MacArthur [in the Philippines] fi rst, and then I would
have called Panama Canal second.” He had thought “we were
open in a more vulnerable way in the Panama Canal, than we
were in Hawaii.” 62
Th e messages sent Short in Hawaii had been terse and rather
cryptic, advising him that
hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility.
Since the U.S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her
present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan
may attack these two powers. 63
Short had been led to believe, by the urgency of the shipments
passing through Hawaii to the Philippines, that Washington
must have had defi nite reasons for believing that the Philippine
Islands were the U.S. territory most seriously threatened by
Japanese attack.
Kimmel Tells the APHB About
Important Intelligence Not Sent
Pearl Harbor Commanders
On Friday, August 25, several days after Kimmel testifi ed
before the Navy Court of Inquiry, he was called to the witness
stand by the APHB which was going on concurrently. He was
asked the usual questions about his relationship with Short and
other matters pertaining to conditions before the attack. 64 Kimmel
61Ibid., pp. 2330–31, Grunert letter of August 31, 1944.
62Ibid., p. 2313; part 27, p. 169.
63Ibid., part 14, p. 1327, Navy message #162203 of October 16.
64Ibid., part 28, pp. 909–48.