Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Army Pearl Harbor Board 457
position in trying to carry out any enterprise to the south of
the Philippines. 58
Marshall realized that the shipments being rushed out to the
Philippines must be alarming Japan. “Nobody could look at that
[buildup],” he told the board,
without realizing that something very critical was in the wind.
Our great problem was how to do these things . . . the shipments,
and collecting the means and getting them out, particularly
to the Philippines, which passed entirely through Hawaii—
without giving such notice to the Japanese that it would have
an unfortunate eff ect in our stalling off this aff air. 59
Th e Joint Board of the Army and Navy conference on November
3 had urged postponing hostilities as long as possible. Th e
November 5 Marshall-Stark memorandum to FDR had recommended
that we not issue an ultimatum that might provoke Japan
to attack. 60 Yet, on November 26, Hull had handed the Japanese
ambassadors the U.S. “ultimatum” he knew the Japanese government
would not accept.
Washington’s eyes appeared to be glued on the Philippines.
Th roughout this time, relatively little thought was given to Hawaii.
Further confi rmation of Washington’s neglect of Pearl Harbor
and its concentration on the Philippines came when Marshall
appeared before the board on September 29, 1944. He was asked
specifi cally about the “One p.m. Message” of December 7 and
his radiogram to Hawaii which had left Washington shortly
after noon that day but was delayed in transit and failed to reach
Pearl Harbor until after the attack. Grunert asked Marshall’s
“[r]easons for not using the telephone to inform General Short
58 Ibid., p. 2327.
59 Ibid., part 29, p. 2329.
60 Ibid., part 14, pp. 1061–62, Exhibit No. 16.