Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

454 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
of naval or military observation is restricted almost literally to
what could be seen with the naked eye, and this is negligible.” 46
According to General Miles, Chief of Army’s G-2, Military
Intelligence, many of our sources of intelligence had dried up.
To have avoided being surprised on the morning of December 7,
would have called for knowing about Japan’s naval bases, staging
areas, and within rather fairly narrow limits, the expected time of
the attack and the direction of approach. He testifi ed:
I did not think any Intelligence offi cer ever thought that he
could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack force or task
force in Japan before it sailed and know where it was going. . . .
It would have been almost a military intelligence miracle. 47
Pye did “not believe the people in Washington expected the
attack any more than the people in Honolulu.” 48 He “thought the
attitude of the offi cers of the Fleet was just about the same as
the attitude of the War and Navy Departments.” Pye, who met
Secretary Knox right upon his arrival in the Hawaiian Islands
about December 10, said
the fi rst thing Knox said to me was, “No one in Washington
expected such an attack—[not] even Kelly Turner.” Admiral
Kelly Turner was in the War Plans Division, was the most
aggressive-minded of all. 49
Marshall testifi ed that he had sent Major General Arnold,
commanding general, Army Air Force, and deputy chief of staff ,
to California specifi cally to expedite the departure of the B-17
bombers to the Philippines. 50 Arnold in turn testifi ed that in
46 Ibid., p. 58. See also U.S. State, Peace and War: 1931–1941, pp. 788–99.
47Ibid., part 27, p. 62.
48Ibid., part 27, p. 550.
49Ibid., p. 554.
50Ibid., part 29, p. 2316.