Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

452 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
one battleship division, one light cruiser division, and two
destroyer divisions, to send into the Atlantic. It hardly seemed
to the Commanders in the Pacifi c that if the situation was as
bad as it was said to be, that was the time to be moving a large
portion of our Fleet into the Atlantic,
especially as “the British Fleet, itself, was many times superior to
the available German ships.” 42
Not only had the Pacifi c Fleet been gutted, Pye said, but the
commanders encountered resistance from Washington whenever
they asked for men and materiel.
During this same period, it became most diffi cult for the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacifi c Fleet to obtain patrol
planes or even to obtain carrier planes, and, up to December
7, not even all of the carriers were equipped with their normal
number of planes. . . . [B]y acts rather than [by] words . . .
Washington failed to indicate urgency. Th is led to “the almost
uniform opinion that while war probably was in the offi ng,” it
was not expected to come without warning. At least the necessary
steps to prepare for a surprise attack were not being taken.
Th e impression given was that if war came, it would be “upon the
initiative of the United States.” 43
Navy Alert to Submarine Attack Threat
Grunert questioned Pye about reconnaissance in Hawaii, the
areas in which the fl eet operated and patrolled with the available
aircraft.
42 Ibid., p. 548.
43 Ibid.