Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Army Pearl Harbor Board 451
been so sensitive to the threat of endangering Washington’s source
of intelligence—the MAGIC intercepts—that he had considered
it “unwise” to do so. 39
Planes and Ships for Hawaii
Not a High Priority
Th e board questioned Admiral Bloch about the Navy’s eff ort
to obtain planes. In 1940 the Navy had gotten money for a
15,000-plane program—a number of PBYs, of which about 108
were allocated to the Fourteenth Naval District (Hawaii) and
150 or so to the U.S. Pacifi c Fleet. At that time the fl eet only had
81. Bloch said he was “quite persistent in . . . trying to get” the
planes.
Commander-in-Chief [Kimmel] knew . . . and he supported
me. Th e correspondence went to the Navy Department asking
for these planes, and I was told repeatedly they would be
given to me but they would not be given to me until sometime
that was indefi nite in the future. 40 . . . [I]t wasn’t a question
of appropriation. It was question of priorities: Th e war was in
[the] Atlantic; Pacifi c wasn’t in the war. . . . Th ey say it in the
war plan: Th e war is in the Atlantic; the Pacifi c is a more or less
quasi-defensive [theater] until they get around to it. 41
According to Admiral William S. Pye, commander battle
force, Pacifi c Fleet, and commander Task Force 1, the situation
was said to be serious “as early really as April 1941.” However, he
reminded the board, the Navy Department had detached from
the Pacifi c Fleet in June
39Ibid., part 29, p. 2328.
40Ibid., p. 800.
41Ibid., pp. 800–01.