Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

450 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a
possibility.
Th e commanders were advised: “Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch
concurs and requests action adees [addressees] to inform
senior Army their areas.” 35 Short did not recall seeing this pessimistic
Navy message. 36
Marshall defended Washington’s warnings as adequate to
have alerted Short to be prepared for the crisis that was coming.
“In our own view,” Marshall testifi ed,
an alert of the character, particularly the character of the two
that occurred at that time, the Naval alert and then the later
Army alert, were suffi cient for any commander with a great
responsibility. 37
Short thought that, if Washington ever really believed that an
attack on the United States was imminent, it would have found
some means to inform him, as commander in the fi eld, if necessary
by scrambler phone. “[O]rdinarily, you could get through in
ten or fi fteen minutes. It was reasonable to believe,” Short testifi
ed, “that if there was going to be a hostile attack, they would have
tried to get it to us by more than one means of communication.”
Th us he had been forced to conclude that “there was a feeling
still at that time that secrecy was more important than the time
element.” 38 But there had been no word from Washington. Under
Grunert’s questioning, Marshall admitted that it would have
been both “possible and feasible to have sent the substance of this
secret information to the Commanding Generals of the Overseas
Departments by courier or otherwise.” However, Marshall had
35Ibid., pp. 1328, 1405, CNO Dispatch #242005, November 24, 1941.
36Ibid., part 27, p. 220.
37Ibid., part 29, p. 2329.
38 Ibid., p.169.