Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Army Pearl Harbor Board 449
a grave situation. . . . [H]ostilities between Japan and Russia are
a strong possibility. Since the US and Britain are held responsible
for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility
that Japan may attack these two powers. 31
All concerned with “the existing grave situation” were “to take
due precautions.” Short believed he had done that with his Alert
#1: “We had had all the utilities guarded, all the bridges, and . . . I
just simply cautioned people that were responsible for that guarding
to be unusually careful.” Short’s interpretation was that the
Navy Department “felt sure” Japan was going to attack Russia; an
attack on the U.S. and G.B. was “only a possibility.” 32
After discussion with the Army’s G-2, Army Chief of War
Plans Gerow “reached the conclusion at that time that the
Navy estimate was more pessimistic than we believed it should
be.” 33 Accordingly the War Department sent Short an October 20
follow-up radiogram in eff ect toning down the Navy’s warning:
Following War Dept. estimate of Japanese situation for your
information STOP Tension between United States and Japan
remains strained but no repeat no abrupt change in Japanese
foreign policy appears imminent. 34
On November 24 the Navy sent another pessimistic message
to its fi eld commanders, including Kimmel:
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very
doubtful x Th is situation coupled with statements of Japanese
Government and movements their naval and military forces
indicate to our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement
31Ibid., part 14, pp. 1327, 1402.
32Ibid., part 27, pp. 218–19.
33Ibid., part 29, p. 2159.
34Ibid., part 14, p. 1327.