Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

448 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
thought that very defi nitely an action by Japan, a pretty radical
action, would be taken almost at once; that that necessarily
would be an overt and open attack on the United States.
However, Miles pointed out, war was not the only possibility;
“there were a good many things Japan could have done, if she
did break those negotiations, short of open war with the United
States, and we were considering all of those matters.” 28
What Did Short Know of the Growing
U.S.-Japanese Crisis Buildup?
Not much! Short believed he knew “in an indefi nite way” that
U.S. policy from sometime in August or September of 1941 was
largely one of delaying, playing for time, with the realization that
war with Japan was inevitable. 29 But he had not been told about the
September 1941 conference when “General Marshall and others
who were in conference with the Secretary of State had decided
that war with Japan was inevitable.” Nor had he known that “we
were negotiating with the British and Dutch about coordinated
military action in the Pacifi c area.” And no one had told him
an agreement had been reached with all nations, the eff ect of
which was that if the Japanese moved forces into Th ailand west
of 100 degrees east or south of 20 degrees north we would
regard that as an act of war. 30
Basically, he knew only what was in the papers.
Short learned from an October 16 Stark-Kimmel message, of
the resignation of Japan’s Prime Minister Konoye and the rise to
power of the more militant General Hideki Tojo creating
28Ibid., part 27, pp. 64–65.
29Ibid., p. 240.
30 Ibid.