Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Army Pearl Harbor Board 447
interpreted the several messages from the War Department in
Washington as approving his sabotage alert. Other witnesses
questioned by the Grunert board also believed Short had been
justifi ed in his decision to alert for sabotage. Short had been given
no indication that the negotiations in Washington were reaching
a breaking point; he had not been told that we were “negotiating
with the British and Dutch about coordinated military action in
the Pacifi c area.” If he had known more about what was going on
in Washington and about the attitude of Washington offi cials, it
would undoubtedly have made him “more conscious that war was
practically unavoidable.” 24
Washington Officials See War as Imminent
In their testimony, various Washington offi cials traced the
deterioration of U.S.-Japanese relations back to various points in
time. General H.H. Arnold, chief of the Army Air Forces, said
it had been apparent as early as January 1941 that relations were
“quite strained.” 25 General Leonard T. Gerow, acting, or assistant,
chief of war plans, said the “general buildup . . . between July and
November . . . led to the conclusion in November that war with
Japan might occur.” 26 Marshall said it had been “a gradual process”;
he had come to the conclusion “some time in the fall of ‘41
that war with Japan was inevitable.” 27 General Miles of Military
Intelligence also saw the situation as precarious from November
27,
when we learned that we had practically given what . . . probably
would be considered by them [the Japanese] an ultimatum
. . . I considered war as very probable if not inevitable. . . . I
24Ibid., part 27, p. 240.
25Ibid., p. 89, Arnold testimony.
26Ibid., part 29, p. 2158.
27Ibid., p. 2326.