Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Army Pearl Harbor Board 445
the Hawaiian air force used to defend against sabotage and
ground attacks, or to provide military police duty. He wrote Short
on October 10 that using the air force for anti-sabotage “seems
inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in
Hawaii.” 13 Marshall told Short to use his Air Force for its normal
purposes and not upon antisabotage guard duty. 14
War Department’s November 27 “war warning” message
#472 had read:
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated. . . . If hostilities
cannot repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires
that Japan commit the fi rst overt act. Th is policy should not
comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to
a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior
to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such
reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but
these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat
not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent. 15
Short found this confusing; he should “undertake such reconnaissance
and other measures as you deem necessary,” but these
measures should be carried out “so as not comma repeat not
comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent.” Because of
this stricture, Short had decided upon Alert #1, designed specifi -
cally to guard against sabotage, espionage, and subversive activities,
rather than one of the more aggressive Alerts. 16 Short had
then radioed Washington, as requested, that he had “alerted to
prevent sabotage.” 17
13Ibid., part 27, p. 22, Marshall testimony.
14Ibid., pp. 22–23. Marshall testimony.
15Message #472 quoted in APHB hearings, part 27, p. 155.
16Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 27, pp. 156, 158. Short testimony.
17Ibid., part 14, p. 1330; part 27, p. 158: “Re your radiogram 472, Department
alerted to prevent sabotage.”