Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

444 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
When asked if “the mission of the Army out there was the protection
of the Navy,” Marshall answered, “Yes. Th at is the reason
for the Army’s being there.” 9
Cooperation Between Pearl Harbor
Commanders Admiral Kimmel and
General Short
Th e Roberts Commission had blamed the Pearl Harbor disaster
to some extent on the failure of the two Pearl Harbor commanders,
Kimmel and Short, to cooperate. Short acknowledged
that there had been some instances when the channels of communication
between the Army and Navy seemed to break down.
For instance, he did not learn until December 8 about the submarine
sunk near Pearl Harbor at about 6:45 a.m. on December 7. 10
However, generally speaking he thought the Army’s relation with
the Navy in Hawaii and his personal relationship with Kimmel
had been good. Kimmel’s associates and Hawaiian locals who
were questioned agreed. 11
General Short Defends His Sabotage Alert
Short had been charged by the Roberts Commission with an
error in judgment for having instituted Alert #1 to guard against
sabotage and for not having alerted for such an attack as that
of December 7. Th e Army’s July 14, 1941, Standard Operating
Procedure, 12 eff ective November 5, 1941, had described three
alerts. So Marshall was familiar with them. However, he had
some defi nite ideas about implementing them. He did not want
9 Ibid., part 27, p. 18.
10 Ibid., p. 285.
11Ibid., p. 798 (Admiral Bloch); part 28, p. 1447 (Businessman Walter Francis
Dillingham).
12Ibid., part 39, p. 77. APHB Report; part 7, pp. 2941–44.