Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Army Pearl Harbor Board 443
attack on Hawaii. . . . [W]e thought, with the addition of more
modern planes, that the defenses there would be suffi cient to
make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such
an attack. 6
In a joint November 27 memorandum Marshall and Stark told
the president emphatically:
Th e most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint,
is to gain time. . . . After consultation with each other,
United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the
Far East agreed that joint military counter action against Japan
should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly
threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United
States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East
Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Th ailand west
of 100º East or south of 10º North—Portuguese Timor, New
Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands. 7
Very soon after Short assumed command of the Hawaiian
Department, Marshall advised him (February 7, 1941) of his
responsibility for protecting the fl eet:
6 Ibid.
Th e fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major
consideration for us, there can be little question about that.
. . . Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that
our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentration,
and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral
Kimmel. 8
7 Ibid., p. 15.
8 Ibid., pp. 16–18.