Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

442 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
committees. It also wrote Secretary of War Stimson and Army
Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, listing the subjects the Board
hoped to cover when they testifi ed. 2 Th e APHB did not have
the power of subpoena, but “in no instance [was] its invitation
to appear and testify . . . ignored.” 3 Th e questioning alternated
among the members. Th e board interviewed 151 witnesses and
was in continuous session until October 20, 1944. 4 Because of
the nature of the revelations, much of the testimony taken during
the fi nal segment of the proceedings was kept off the record and
preserved in a separate TOP SECRET report.
Army Chief of Staff General Marshall:
US.-Japan Relations in 1941, Increasingly Tense
Marshall, the Board’s fi rst witness, stated:
[W]e were very fearful of some warlike act by the Japanese,
which immediately would have brought about a state of war
in the Pacifi c, for which, at the time, we were not prepared.
. . . [T]here were numerous indications . . . all of which indicated
a very serious crisis developing in the Pacifi c in relation
to Japan. 5
Marshall said he and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Stark
made it very clear . . . to the Secretary of State, that it was of
the utmost importance . . . to delay so long as possible any
outbreak in the Pacifi c. . . . We anticipated, beyond a doubt, a
Japanese movement in Indo-China and the Gulf of Siam, and
against the Malay Peninsula. We anticipated also an assault on
the Philippines. We did not, so far as I can recall, anticipate an
2 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, pp. 2087–89.
3 Ibid., part 39, p. 24.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., part 27, p. 14.