Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

438 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Saff ord had told Kimmel about the important Japanese
intercepts. But except for what he had learned about them from
Rochefort in 1942, 56 Kimmel had only Saff ord’s word that they
had ever existed. Even so, Kimmel didn’t want to lose the chance
of having his day in court. Whenever anyone asked him about his
possible court martial, he always replied that he was ready; he had
always wanted “a free, open and public hearing.”
“In the critical years following Pearl Harbor,” Kimmel had
understood why he “had to bear, in silence, the burden of shame
heaped upon [him] by the report of the Roberts Commission
and by published interpretations of that report.” However, he felt
that now, with our armed forces on the off ensive on all fronts, he
owed it to his family, friends, and the public to make it clear that
he wanted
a trial by Court-Martial at the earliest practicable date. . . . To
be held under a shadow of blame for an additional prolonged
and indefi nite period is intolerable. Th e public has a right to
know what happened.
And he, Kimmel, had “an American’s right to [his] day in
court.” 57
Kimmel sent his attorney, Charles B. Rugg, and his assistant,
Edward B. Hanify, to Washington in the spring of 1944, to try
to have Congress extend the deadline for his court martial. After
a rather heated debate, Congress approved another six-month
deadline extension and, at the same time, passed a joint resolution
calling for investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack by both the
Army and Navy. 58
56Saff ord, “Th e Kita Message: No Longer a Mystery,” manuscript (copy in
author’s fi les).
57Kimmel, May 25, 1944, letter to Senator Sinclair Weeks (R., Mass.). Copy in
Th omas Kimmel Collection. Quoted in Toland, Infamy, 1982, pp. 78–79.
58Th e New York Times, June 8, 1944, p. 14.